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Abstract

Um uganda, the ritual of communal labor practiced in Rwanda since pre-colonial

kingdoms, has a long and varied history of implementation. Once

an

integral part of the

patron-client relationship, umuganda originated as the exchange of cattle for feudal
protection; currently, it is a system of mandatory labor being utilized for post-genocide
political and economic development. Umuganda has been championed by both past and
present presidential administrations as the foundational centerpiece of progress, yet it also
served as an instrumental tool in mass participation during the genocide. This paper will
focus on the historical roots and transformation of umuganda in order to deconstruct its
current use as encouraging economic and political development.
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Introduction

The historical process will dictate that umuganda has a bleak and destructive
discourse deeply imbedded in the peasantry and agricultural economic system of
Rwanda. However, the general consensus among current policy makers and international
donor organizations sees umuganda as the essence of rebuilding the country's economy,
nationalism, and spirit. Forced manual labor under ubureetwa was one of the strongest
dividing factors of Hutu and Tutsi in colonial Rwanda, and yet u m ugan da , a
"communal," though mandatory, manual labor system is considered instrumental in
building inclusion and developing nationalism in post-genocide Rwanda. How can
umuganda, fresh in collective memory as a method that drove people to commit acts of

genocide, be incorporated to promote prosperity and rebuild trust?
There are various linguistic interpretations of the word umuganda. Traditionally,
it is considered to be a translation of "contribution" and "cooperative communal labor."
Rwandan linguist Dr. Eugene Shimamungu (2005) gives a historically detailed definition
of umuganda as "a piece of wood that is driven into the ground in order to serve as pillars
for a house. . .When neighbors were building, each person would bring a piece of timber
to assist in building and in that mutual self-help context the term 'umuganda' means
community self-help."
However, the definition of umuganda reflects its political and economic utility
over time. For example, as Verwimp (2000) confirms umuganda is a "Kinyarwanda
word for the wood used to construct a house . ..," he proceeds to qualify that it ".. .was
one of Habyarimana's favorite speech topics and one of the regime's most influential
policies" (p. 344).

During the genocide, radio stations would use umuganda

5
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euphemistically to call people to collective action through "a thinly veiled code referring
to 'work' instead of killing" (Li, 2004, p. 12). Whereas, the contemporary Rwandan
government administration states that um uganda translates to "We work together"
(Agbor, 2011). It is clear the historical roots of umuganda demonstrate a call to collective
action, yet it is the context of this action that varies based on societal and political needs.
Scholarship on the Rwandan genocide has predominantly focused on causation,
particularly on the ethnic development and distinction of Hutu and Tutsi, in addition to
the gradual distrust between these groups as rooted in the pre-colonial and colonial state
(Des Forges, 1972; Lemarchand, 1970, 1994, 1995; C. Newbury, 1989, 1995; D.
Newbury, 1994). Jefremovas (1997) has cited this debate to be one of a "meta-conflict,"
or "a conflict about the nature of conflict" (p. 92). Whereas, revisionist scholarship has
marked Hutu and Tutsi as economic distinctions (Mamdani, 2001), these various
interpretations of history center on "the shaping of ethnic antagonisms" and "what it
means to be Rwandan" (Jefremovas, 1997, 93).

The research gives a thorough

examination of the animosities that were cultivated; however, it focuses minutely on
socioeconomic status and, furthermore, how this status explains mass participation in the
genocide. Mamdani (2001) outlines the academic investigation into this phenomenon as
two predominant discourses: "one focuses on society, the other on the state" (p. 199).
In fact, the causation debate highlights the distinctions between the political
situations surrounding the genocide in Rwanda and those that influenced the mass
killings and genocide in neighboring Burundi in 1972 and the early-mid 1990s. As
Lemarchand (1994) notes:
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It is important to stress that Rwanda and Burundi cannot be understood
independently of each other. Historically, and to this day, ethnic strife in
the former has had a profound impact on the destinies of the latter, and
vice versa. Just as the Hutu-led revolution in Rwanda has contributed
directly to the sharpening of ethnic polarities in Burundi, so the
assassination of that state's first popularly elected President, Melchior
Ndadaye (a Hutu), at the hands of the all-Tutsi army, on 21 October 1993,
provides the indispensable backdrop for an understanding to the Rwanda
genocide. (p. 585)
The historiography of these two nations has traditionally treated the cultural distinction of
Hutu and Tutsi as "fixed," while considering political actors and governmental systems
as evolutionary (Newbury, 2001, pp. 258-59). In fact, political structures of Rwanda and
Burundi are not detached from social distinctions of Hutu and Tutsi, rather they
underscore the differences in government structure as independence ushered in a Hutu
dominated republic in Rwanda and a constitutional monarchy in Burundi (Lemarchand,
1994, p. 581).
Therefore, as the historiography dictates, if ethnic motivations cannot be entirely
legitimized, how does history account for mass participation in the genocide? A popular,
and easy, answer is to assume all Rwandans are socially predisposed to obedience
(Prunier, 1995, p. 141-142). This is not entirely as problematic or simplistic as it sounds
considering the majority of the Rwandan citizenry was uneducated and had a long
tradition of living under authoritarian control. Yet, this obedience to authority can be
further analyzed through an examination of umuganda. Rather than focus on ethnic
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identity and obedience as the motivational source of conflict, mass participation can be
accounted for through the use and stimulus of umuganda, collective action that all
Rwandans were historically familiar with.
The study of umuganda brings the focus on the peasantry, whereas the traditional
concentration has been on the roles of the state and leadership elite. Rural society is an
integral, arguably the most important, component in Rwandan development. Though the
term "peasant" is problematic in Rwanda1, it is precisely this large portion of the
population that serves as an economic and political necessity in building a sustainable
state immersed in the world market. In an entirely agriculturally-based economic system,
the peasants are the foundation for future development.
President Juvenal Habyarimana understood this, as does current President Paul
Kagame. Peasant ideology is "rural romanticism," and control of the population is one
that leadership elites continue to seek and maintain. Yet, the subaltern model receives
little attention in deconstructing the historical context of the genocide, as Newbury &
Newbury (2000) note:
The dominant v1s10n of Rwanda's history emphasized political
homogeneity, ethnic distinctions, and the power of the state. In so doing,
it sublimated alternative visions, which expressed regional particularity,
diverse forms of identity (based on kin, class, occupation, and friendship
networks), and the interaction of local agency with elite policy. (p. 833)

1

Peasants are traditionally subsistence agriculturalists, though in Rwanda this is more closely associated

with the label "Hutu" (Ryan, 20 1 0, p. 3). As the terms 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi' will be deconstructed in Chapter
1 , the term 'peasant' will be used to denote any Rwandan citizen who comprises the 90% of the population
that work as subsistence agriculturalists, of Hutu or Tutsi origin, with the consideration that these terms are
now illegal in Rwanda.
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In an economy based entirely on agriculture and a development model based
entirely on the input and cooperation of the peasantry, it is worth examining the
genocide through this same lens.

The following is a historical examination of

umuganda, how it was used to incite mass participation in the 1994 genocide, and its

contemporary role in Rwandan economic and political development.
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Pre-Colonial Systems of Labor

The historical roots of um uganda are found by examining the ideological
development of Rwanda's labor force. The socioeconomic structure of Rwandan society
is obtusely triangular with roughly 90% of the population living in poor, rural areas.
However, umuganda is structured as a top-down program, as the public works necessities
are driven by the demands and needs of those in leadership positions (Verwimp, 2000, p.
346). As the relationship between elite leaders and the civilian population is a reliable
indicator of how society functions as a whole, the development of this relationship is
essential in providing a context in which umuganda is currently being instituted.
The rapidity and mass mobilization during the genocide is often attributed to an
innate obedience on the part of the Rwandan people, often qualified by the use of the
media, or more specifically, the radio. Yet, umuganda, a labor system that has been
institutionalized in Rwanda history, plays an often overlooked and vital role.

The Development of the King's Labor Force

Rwanda is currently a country roughly the size of Switzerland, minute

m

comparison to the vast states that make up the majority of its neighbors. Prior to German
exploration at the tum of the twentieth century, however, the Rwandan kingdom was
considered to be one of the most powerful in the region. Rwanda's very name can be
translated to "Great Expansion" (Kagame, 1972, p. 50), but the extent of power is a prime
interpretational target for many African historians, primarily those concerned with the
divisive development of Hutu and Tutsi as ethnicities. As David Newbury (1994) notes
in his exhaustive study on the dynastic chronology of Rwanda, "while as independent

10
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polities [are] assumed to be culturally autonomous, source material from one is often
drawn on to fill in the gaps of others ... [this is] especially common where there were
powerful kingdoms whose political boundaries were assumed to be rigid and inviolate"
(p. 191). These scholarly assumptions are based on the records of oral tradition, and the
exact determination of dates and regions where leaders were said to have governed can
vary from historian to historian (see Table 1). Though the structure and lineage of the
Rwandan monarchy can be traced to antiquity, for the purpose of this examination, the
discussion will be confined to the relationship of the kings to their citizens immediately
leading up to German exploration.
Table 1
Rwanda Royal Chronology per various authorities
Ruganzu Bw1mba

Rrrutit

:-.1mrilJJirnbur.a

KaRam�

Van.�ina

1312-1345

1458-1482

1532-1559

1470-1520

1468-1470

C)·ilima Rugwe

1345-1378

1482-1506

1559-1586

K.igeri Mu kobanya

1378·141 I

1506-1528

I 586-1588

1520-1543

Mibambwc Mu1abaz.i

1411-1444

I528· 1552

15811-1593

154'.l-1566

Yubi Galuma

1444-1477

1552-1576

1593-WJJ

1566-1589

Ncfahiro Cyamna1are

1477-1510

1576-1600

16m

1589-1600

Ruganz.u :'\don

1510-1541

l WO- I 624

1603-16:10

1(.00-1623

Mutara Semugeslu

1543-1576

1624-1648

1610-1657

1621-1646

K.Jgeri :-;yamuhc.�hera

J 57<'>- l<i09

164 . j(,72

1<'>57-1<'> 4

1646-l('.('.9

Mibambwc (i1sanura

1(-0<J-1642

1672-1(196

1684-1711

16<'>9-1692

Yul11 Mazimpaka

1642-1675

l696-1720

1711-1738

1692-1715

1720-1744

1n -1756

1715-1731

Cyihrna Rujui;ira

1675-1708

1744-1768

1756-1765

IBl-1759

Kigcn !l:dabarasa

17011-1741

176R-1792

1765-1792

1769-1792

Mibambwe Senrabyo

1741-1746

1792-1797

1792-171)7

l 79"!.-1797

1746-

1797-18�0

1797-1830

1791.11no

1853

lR:l0-1 60

I :-10-IR60

1830-1860

I 1\51-1895

1860-1!195

I860· l 895

IMO·IR95

1896

1895-1896

Karcmcra Rwaka

Yuhi Gahindiw
Mulara R"·cgera
K.igeri Rwabugm

·

M1bambwc Ru1arindwa
Yuhi Mu�inga

I 897-1931

1897-1931

1896-19:\1

Mutara Rudahigwa

19'.\i-1959

19�1-1959

1931-1959

Source: Newbury, 1994, p. 217
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The Rwandan dynastic cycle centered around Imana, or the "dynamic principle of
life and fertility" (Coupez & d'Hertefelt, 1964, p. 460). Rulers utilized this divine
connection for the production of food and the prosperity of the people through traditional
rites and rituals. The patron-client relationship evolved over time, as the state became
more centralized. "The state of Rwanda emerged as did many a state in the region,
through the amalgamation of several autonomous chiefships into a single nuclear
kingdom, under the leadership of a royal clan" (Mamdani, 2001, p. 62). During the 14th
and 15th centuries, the mwami had authority that more closely resembled that of a priest
or shaman with little to no power over the population and even less over production. The
main power seemed to rest in the lineage heads, who organized and distributed lands in
return for fealty (usually in the form of food or beer) from the clients (Jefremovas, 1997,
p. 93).
It was not until the 16th century, as threats from bordering states increased, that
the mwami' s power was expanded to create a permanent military organization. "Power
was based on the control of men, not the control of land" (Jefremovas, 1997, p. 94). This
control of men contributed to the modem development of patron-client relations; the
transmission of fealty transitioned from umuheto, the giving of cattle from the client to
the patron in return for protection, to ubuhake, the patron's use of one of the client's cows
(Des Forges, 1972, pp. 5-6; Mamdani, 2001, p. 65). The nature of the relationship
between the king and his subjects shifted dramatically; whereas, once the ownership of
the cattle had belonged to the client, the cattle were now for the mwam i to take at his
discretion. This shift is significant in understanding the dynamic between the leader and
the extent of his control over his subjects. The relationship developed from reciprocal to

FROM THE GROUND UP

12

authoritarian and, eventually, this exhibition of despotic dominance and demand over the
population contributed to ubureetwa, the indentured servitude of mainly the Hutu
population during the 19th century.
The practices of u b ureetwa and umuganda are directly related. Whereas,
ubureetwa required the peasants to work a certain number of days a week on the land, in

relative serfdom, the enforcement of this manual labor system evolved with umuganda in
the 20th century, a mandatory contribution to public works and infrastructure, including
but not limited to, land cultivation and agriculture.

The Economic Distinction between Hutu and Tutsi

It is seemingly impossible to discuss any part of Rwandan history without
acknowledging the development of the Tutsi and Hutu, both as economic groups and
separate ethnicities. In fact, the majority of literature surrounding Rwanda concentrates
mainly on these two groups2 and the historiography is seemingly divided. Early historians
had two differing viewpoints regarding the power structure of pre-colonial Rwandan
kingdoms: either the state was relatively hierarchical with a system of patronage3 or it
was considered exploitative with a concentration on the ethnicity of Hutu-Tutsi.
However, contemporary scholarship concentrates on the ever-changing nature of precolonial history, primarily focusing on the development of ethnicity in Rwanda. Although
it serves as an integral part of the region's history, the irony "is that ethnicity is hard to
define in Rwanda, because people have the same culture, language, religion, share a
2 The Twa, the third Rwandan social group, are often overlooked in discussions of ethnic development

because they did not play a large role in the genocide and comprise less than I% of the population.
3 The debate can be extended regarding the equity of the client-state relationship.
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common history, live together and intermarry . . . Ethnicity is a very malleable category"
(Jefremovas, 1997, pp. 92-3). Ethnicity is considered by many to be the invention of
colonists, using the designations of Tutsi and Hutu to describe an economic and
agricultural status. Simply, the Tutsi were pastoralists, a minority of the population
considered to center their modes of production around the use of cattle. The Hutus,
comprising the majority of the population, were subsistence farmers and cultivators. This
relationship evolved over time. Davidson (1992) states:
The general nineteenth century move toward more emphatic forms of
centralized power had developed the dominance of a minority group, the
Tutsi, over a Hutu majority. But the manner of this nineteenth-century
dominance was mild, and was regulated by 'lord and vassal' relationships,
which had some resemblance to the simpler forms of European feudalism.
(p. 249)4
There is also an academic concentration on the exploitation of the Tutsi rulers against
their Hutu majority. 5 The notion of client-state relations, in which the Tutsi has dominant
governing lineage and the Hutu are the subservient majority, is later reinforced and
perpetuated by colonial administration.

4

This explains how the Germans and Belgians saw the relationship, as Tutsi king to Hutu subject, with

little regard for any regional or cultural variations.
5

In fact, this historical (mis)perception was exploited and turned into a major catalyst for "Hutu Power"

propaganda after independence and in leading to the 1994 genocide.
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The modem conception of Hutu-Tutsi relations, clientship, and ethnicity can be
attributed to the rule of mwam i Kigeri Rwabugiri, who reigned from 1853/1860-1895
(Newbury, 1994, p. 217).6 As Mamdani (2001) states:
He further centralized the state structure, but through a series of reforms that
had a contradictory outcome: at the same time as it expanded Hutu
participation in the army from nonmilitary to fighting roles - and appointed
Hutu to administrative positions while taking on the power of uppity Tutsi
aristocratic lineages - these reforms debased the social position of the Hutu
outside the army and administration and further polarized the social
opposition between Hutu and Tutsi. (p. 69)
Rwabugiri was responsible for solidifying the Hutu as the dependent peasant population
and the Tutsis as the lineage heads of land and state. This is not to say that there were not
Tutsi peasants, nor Hutu elite. In fact, the majority of the Tutsi were commoners and had
more in common with their fellow peasants than with the ruling elite. It was the Hutus
that had risen to elite status (kwihutura), through marriage, fealty, or control· of land, who
proved to have little in common with the masses that they exploited (Jefremovas, 1997, p.
96). These Hutus could essentially shed their Hutu roots and acquire Tutsi status7 as the
categories of Hutu and Tutsi evolved over time. "There was a great deal more individual
mobility and interchange than any static model of some collective 'Rwandan past' can
account for. ..region was more important than royalty in defining identity, and ecology
more influential than ethnicity in molding people's lives" (Newbury & Newbury, 2000,

6

Kagame believes that Rwabugiri began his kingship in 1 853, while other Rwandan historical authorities

7

Though simplified, this is one justification for viewing Tutsi and Hutu as political and/or economic status,

cite 1 860 as his first year of administration. Refer to Table l.

rather than separate ethnicities.
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p. 840). However, this qualifying factor in economic identity disappeared under colonial
authority.
The relationship of the king to the masses shifted as Rwabugiri centralized state
and administrative control and solidified population divisions as European colonialism
began. It is acknowledged that Rwabugiri was "good and generous to the people"
(Pottier, 1986, p. 222) and even his granary was called rutsindamapfa, "conqueror of
famine" (Smith, 1998, 744). However, there was also widespread resistance to the
aggressive expansion of the Rwandan kingdom during his reign.
The intensification of conflict between Tutsi and Hutu during this period
was due rather to the multiplication of aristocratic lineages, their violent
competition for power at the expense of the monarchy, the expansion of
cattle herds, and the adoption of American crops fostering population
growth, which created land scarcity and enabled aristocrats to exploit the
peasantry more ruthlessly. (Iliffe, 2007, p. 190)
It is not surprising that Rwabugiri is seen as the last legitimate Rwandan king, and it is
his policies that the colonists would interpret as the establishment of Hutu and Tutsi class
distinctions . German colonial authorities (assisted by anti-Tutsi uprising between two
clans, the Abeega and the Abanyiginya) replaced Rwabugiri 's successor, Mibambwe
Ruarindwa with Yuhi Musinga (Mamdani, 2001, pp. 70-1; Smith, 1998, pp. 744-5). In
the face of their new king, Rwandans revolted. The illegitimacy of his rule was only
compounded by the need of Germany authority and arms to suppress these uprisings.
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Under Colonial Authority, 1895-1962

The Industrial Revolution and the onslaught of technological innovations in
Europe during the 19th century sparked a lively debate among philosophers and social
scientists regarding the existence and use of colonies. As many European countries
sought cheap sources of labor in new colonial enterprises, the discussion centered on
justifying this exploitation. How did the indigenous peoples fit into policies of expanding
capitalist ventures and the liberal, bourgeois lifestyle? African peoples were viewed as a
raw resource in dire need of refinement and civil-ization, treated as a cog in the vast
industrial machine. Seeing as race science was "all the rage in Europe" at the time,
creating a colonial bureaucracy based on racial ideologies was the easiest form of
implementation and manipulation (Gourevitch, 2005, pp. 198). Through religion and
science, European authorities would use both conventional and modern means to
rationalize colonization.
Religious justification, dominantly through the Hamitic hypothesis, appealed to
European morality of the day. Originating from the Judaic and Christian Old Testament,
the story of Ham begins with an inebriated Noah lying naked and incapacitated. While
Noah's other sons averted their eyes from the scene, Ham did not. The myth follows that
the descendants of Ham, full of sin for not acknowledging his father's shame, were to
become Negro Africans.
While Genesis says nothing about the descendants of Ham being black,
the claim that they were cursed by being black first appeared in the oral
traditions of the Jews when these were recorded in the sixth-century
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Babylonian Talmud; that same myth depicts Ham as a sinful man and his
progeny as degenerates. (Mamdani, 2001, pp. 80-1)
Ham, depicted as Caucasian, is considered the father of the peoples that moved into
modem-day Egypt and Ethiopia; 8 this group eventually migrated south to invade and
conquer the land that was inhabited by Bantu tribes. Pre-colonial Rwandan history
dictates this movement as that of the Tutsi; in correlation with finding available land for
their grazing cattle they migrated into Hutu territory. The colonial classifications of Hutu
and Tutsi are therefore rooted in the Hamitic hypothesis. In fact, the growing field of race
science would provide deeper distinctions and racial undertones for the growing
animosity between these groups, manipulating traditional distinctions of pastoral Tutsi
and cultivating Hutu.
The history of the two groups mirrored the religious justification for their racial
differences; because it was believed that Hamitic descendants were once Caucasian, or at
least had closer ancestry to Europeans, Tutsi dominance was established in the eyes of
the Germans and then Belgians.9 In fact, kings and leaders at the time of colonization
were Tutsi, which only supported colonial claims of Tutsi superiority. Therefore, the
"real" Africans were the Hutu, descendants of the migrating Bantu tribes and seen as the
original inhabitants of the land. Langford (2005) comments:
This viewpoint . ..emanates, with its various religious, biological and cultural
variants, from the writings of an English colonial explorer, John Speke, who
came to Africa in search of the source of the River Nile. When he entered

8

Mahmood Mamdani delivers an extremely detailed account of the various versions and mutations of the

Hamitic hypothesis in

9

When Victims Become Killers, p. 76-87.

The Belgians gained control of the Rwand�n territory as a result of German defeat in WWI.
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the Great Lakes region, he was moved to make a comparison between the
kingdoms of this region and those encountered on his previous visit to
Somalia. From this comparison, there emerged the 'theory' of an aristocracy
of pastoralists of Abyssinian origin falling within the wider colonialist
vision that all traces or elements of civilisation in Africa were the result of
external and non-indigenous people or influences. (p. 23)
Religious and scientific justification worked in conjunction to fully exhibit the black
African as the "other."
Although it began with German colonialism, the Belgians exacerbated scientific
racism. Eugenics was supported by tangible evidence and not just religious or historical
myth. Measurements of nose and torso length, forehead width, skull sizes, even average
heights and bone structure, were calculated, recorded, and used as a determining factor in
the categorization of Hutu and Tutsi for those whose familial lineage was unclear.10
Aside from the overt racist nature of such practices, by modem standards this "exact"
science was untenable at best; generations of intermarriage and dominant/recessive
genetics make it highly unlikely that either group had remarkably distinct features as to
warrant such segregation. By forcing all of the Rwandans into a specific group, it created
a "distinct internal homogeneity" in which the group would "reproduce itself from within
itself' (Langford, 2005, p. 2). In addition to the 1926 institution of identity cards stating
which ethnic category one belonged to,11 all areas of daily life, including the school
system and local administration, would reinforce the racial differences.

10

Erin Baines (2003) writes a compelling essay regarding these practices and the "body politics" of the

genocide.
11

Identity cards would not be eliminated from Rwandan life until after the genocide, 63 years later.
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Colonial Practices of Forced Labor

With colonialism came a new form of European-styled bureaucratic
administration. "Force was integral to the process of exploitation - particularly forced
labor" (Mamdani, 2001, p. 95).

The Belgians transformed the power structure in

Rwanda with the ultimate goal of deflating the power of the monarchy and increasing the
power of local chiefs who were more efficiently manipulated (furthermore, centralizing
the power of the chiefs). Prior to colonization, the "trinity of chiefs" consisted of the chief
ofpastures (a Tutsi), the chief of the land (a Hutu), and the chief of men (usually a Tutsi)

(Mamdani, 2005, p. 90). It was a system which had "served to protect the [Ba]hutu
peasantry against undue exactions" (Lemarchand, 1970, pp. 119-20). However, Belgian
administration unraveled the Rwandan system at its core.

Animosity and distrust

developed between the Hutu and Tutsi as colonists redirected support from one group to
the other; Europeans attempted to play the Hutus and the Tutsis against one another,
while subjecting both groups to an increasingly despotic state.
That is not to say, however, that the Rwandans were so easily manipulated. As
Des Forges (1999) writes:
Rwandan officials were not helpless pawns but rather real players in the
game of administrative reform. Politically astute, they understood how to
evade the intent of European orders even while apparently conforming to
them. Chiefs and sub-chiefs seemed to accept the reduction in numbers of
officials, but in fact kept on using unofficial representatives out on the hills
who continued living off the local people. As a result, the density of
administration and consequent customary burdens on the people diminished
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little, if at all, in the central part of the country, while in the north and
southwest, they actually increased because of the installation of resident
officials. At the same time, the chiefs and sub-chiefs-and later other
administrative agents-enforced a series of wholly new demands imposed
by the colonialists as part of their effort to integrate Rwanda into the world
economy. They often found ways to tum these new requirements, such as
building roads or planting cash crops, to their personal profit. (p. 33)
Yet, the majority (if not all) of these aforementioned positions belonged to the Tutsi.
With the disparities in education and jobs in the colonial bureaucracy awarded to the
Tutsi, the Hutus were consistently marginalized.12
In 1924, Belgian authorities reinstituted Rwabugiri's ubureetwa, requiring that the
Rwandans work for 42 days a year, though it was hardly a regular occurrence. There are
reports that in some areas it was upwards of 142 days a year of forced labor (Mamdani,
2001,

p.

97). This practice was required of Hutu only, and "more than any other, it

testified to the existence of Tutsi privilege in colonial Rwanda and highlighted the social
separation between the petit Tutsi and the average Hutu" (Mamdani, 2001, p. 98). Labor
practices proved to be a significantly divisive element between these two groups, as it
became the physical reinforcement of Tutsi superiority coupled with the consistent
subjugation of the Hutu majority. How the colonial authorities perceived the Hutu and
Tutsi, and the way in which they utilized and exploited these differences, created a
12 Lemarchand (1994) states that "although [Burundi] shar[ed] a similar ethnic map -with Tutsi

pastoralists said to represent approximately 14% of the total population, Hutu agriculturalists 85%, and
Pygmoid Twa 1% -- only in Rwanda was Tutsi overrule highly institutionalized. Burundi society was

characterized by greater complexity and fluidity, with power gravitating into the hands of a princely
oligarchy (the so-called ganwa) whose identity was separate from that of either Hutu or Tutsi . Which helps
explain why Burundi acceded to independence as yet untouched by the revolutionary upheavals during
1959-62 that brought the Hutu in Rwanda to power." (p. 58 1 )

FROM THE GROUND UP

21

relationship of oppression that would be the breeding ground for generations of
animosity.
Over the following 30 years, the Hutu became restless and resentful towards both
the colonial government and their Tutsi counterparts. "To consolidate the growing Hutu
social movement towards 'equality,' Hutu intellectuals reproduced colonial histories of
the 'alien' Tutsi and the 'indigenous' Hutu" (Baines, 2003, p. 481) reinforcing the idea
that the Tutsi were "outsiders" who had migrated into Hutu land. The Hutus were
politically and economically marginalized (Newbury, 1995, p. 12) and as their resentment
began to transform into a growing social movement, the Belgian authorities shifted
policies to favor the Hutu (including replacing ubureetwa with taxation in 1949)
(Mamdani, 2001, p. 116). Boudreaux (2009) notes, "these reforms may have been an
attempt, on the part of the Belgians, to lessen ethnic tensions or it may have been a way
to promote loyalty in a group that then might favor a continued Belgian presence in the
country" (p. 3). Either way, the Tutsis resisted the change. Rather than embracing the
principles of unified self-determination, as was the catalyst for many independence
movements across the colonial world, Rwanda was a nation divided.
Tensions came to a head in 1959. A group of educated Hutu documented their
intentions and beliefs in the Hutu Manifesto, a written presentation of the situation in
Rwanda revolving around racial ideologies of Hutu superiority. The writers of the
Manifesto created the Party of the Hutu Emancipation Movement (PARMEHUTU), a
political party formalized on the notion of returning Rwanda to its "original" state, one in
which the Hutu, as its first inhabitants and the majority of the population, were central to
the leadership, governance, and future; a state which would be devoid of Tutsi. In
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response, the Tutsi committed to maintaining their leadership through the continuation of
the monarchy after independence, formed the Rwanda National Union (UNAR) party.
Langford (2005) notes that these two political parties:
. . . [and the] form of the post-colonial nation-state was, therefore, linked to
the outcome of a struggle between two racial groups. This struggle was
resolved through the 'social revolution' of November 1959, a
'spontaneous' Hutu uprising which expelled the Tutsi king, chiefs and
administrative cadre from Rwanda, and situated the PARMEHUTU as the
dominant representative of the Hutu people." (p. 5)
Thousands of Tutsis fled the country, and the UNAR (later to become the Rwandan
Patriotic Front, or RPF) were operating in exile. In the following four years, Rwanda
would experience a state in flux coupled with great violence. The now ruling Hutu were
determined to maintain their power, no matter the cost to the people or land.

Umuganda

in the First and Second Republics, 1962-1985

Under the auspices of establishing a nation-state in which the Hutu were political,
socially, and economically more powerful than their Tutsi counterparts, independent
Rwanda was born. Gregoire Kayibanda, the leader of the PARMEHUTU and the
President of the Republic, was determined to maintain Hutu superiority at the expense of
multi-partyism and ideological separation from the colonial state.

For example,

Kayibanda and the First Republic maintained the use of identity cards in order to assure a
clear demarcation between those who were Hutu and those who were Tutsi; rather than
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build a sense of Rwandan nationalism after independence, this continued division
encouraged a new nation built on racial identity. "In this manner, the First Republic
maintained an essential continuity with the previous colonial system through its racial
demarcation of the people who composed its nation-state" (Vidal, 1995, pp. 16-17 as
quoted in Langford, 2005, p. 6). All prospects of a multi-party democracy were gradually
abolished as continued invasions from organized Tutsi refugees occurred through the
1960s. These invasions gave Kayibanda reason to peg the Tutsi as true "outsiders" and
served to reinforce the idea of Hutus belonging to Rwanda, while the Tutsi were merely
trying to force themselves upon the nation. Any indication of Tutsi entrance into the
political system was perceived as an "invasion" into governance; therefore Rwanda was
increasingly a de facto single-party state under the PARMEHUTU.
After independence, the rural peasantry did not see any drastic change in their
daily lives. The Hutu elite began to enjoy the luxuries once only afforded to Tutsi and
colonial authorities, yet the majority of the Rwandan peasantry remained impoverished. It
was during this time that Kayibanda, the former head of Trafipro (a national coffee
cooperative), began to institute coffee as "Rwanda's major export and the primary source
of foreign currency" (Kamola, 2007, p. 580). Kayibanda, a businessman from the
southern region of Gitarama, concentrated his development efforts in his home region,
supplying jobs and appointments based greatly on patronage and nepotism.

This

regionalism developed divisions within the PARMEHUTU. "Ironically, the Kayibanda
regime faced growing criticism in the 1960s that it had not done enough to advance Hutu
representation in civil society" (Mamdani, 2001, p. 13 5). These criticisms of both
education and employment came from Hutu (predominately living in the northern regions
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of the country) and posed as the basis for a successful coup d'etat led by Kayibanda's
cousin General Juvenal Habyarimana in 1973.
Habyarimana continued Kayibanda' s development efforts by economically
focusing agriculture on the production of coffee. One of the main differences between
Kayibanda's administration and that of his successor was that Habyarimana understood
the need to utilize all Rwandans as a work force. In order to do so, he would have to
reclassify Tutsi to be a legally viable source of production.
The key change from the First to the Second Republic - a change that seems
to have gone unnoticed by many an observer of Rwandan politics - was a
shift in the political identity of the Tutsi from a race to an ethnic group.
While the First Republic considered the Tutsi a 'race,' the Second Republic
reconstructed the Tutsi as an 'ethnicity' and, therefore, a group indigenous
to Rwanda... As a 'race' under the First Republic, the Tutsi had been
confined to the civic sphere and barred from the political sphere; as an
'ethnicity' under the Second Republic, however, they were allowed
participation in the political sphere, but limited to a scope said to befit their
minority status. (Mamdani, 2001, p. 138)
Habyarimana's political party, Mouvement Revolutionaire National pour le
Developpement (MRND), became the political party of all Rwandan citizens. While the
one-party state was an attempt to create a form of unity and nationalism among
Rwandans, a quota system in which all state apparatus would be proportional to the
population (89% Hutu, 10% Tutsi, and 1% Twa) maintained that the Hutu would remain
firmly in control (Langford, 2005, p. 9-10).
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Habyarimana made um uganda the centerpiece for Rwandan development.
(Re)Established in 1974, umuganda made the peasantry responsible for ensuring Rwanda
was an economically, self-sufficient nation. Rwanda was to serve as a role model for
newly independent nations across the African continent, and the glorification of the
peasantry under um uganda demonstrated their importance in this venture. Philip
Verwimp (2000) discusses the stress Habyarimana placed on participation in manual
labor, as well as the policies that were instituted to support and create growth among the
labor force, which included the dissolution of any family planning programs - "more
people means more peasants and thus a larger supply of labor" (p. 343). In addition,
coercing all Rwandans to work achieved another aim - peasants felt triumphant as
intellectuals were aptly humiliated and forced to join in with the manual laborers.
Quelling dissent among the most educated through the implementation of umuganda
reinforced then-current interpretations of "development ideology," mainly that Rwanda
was a poor rural society; in addition, keeping Rwandan intellectuals on the same playing
field as their uneducated counterparts ensured that Habyarimana stayed in power
(Boudreaux, 2009, p. 9).
The institution of umuganda maintained that the peasantry, Hutu and Tutsi alike,
shared social and economic responsibility under the auspices of the MRND single-party
state; as Habyarimana states in a 1973 speech, "one who refuses to work is harmful to
society" (Langford, 2005, p. 10-11). While umuganda created a stable social order, three
conditions emerged that would be contributing factors to the future development of the
country: the refocus of a monetized economy towards a physical labor system, the
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promotion of nationalism and inclusion (though within the ethnic delineations of their
group), and efficient mobilization of the population.
First, as the economy refocused away from the "monetization" that occurred under
colonialism it moved towards a rudimentary system based on physical and tangible labor.
Although a self-proclaimed champion of the peasantry, Habyarimana was fearful of
slums and encouraged civilians to take up residence in the highlands on their own farms,
rather than migrate towards the major city centers. In addition, umuganda promoted
nationalism through a "return to ancestral values" and to "engage one's self' in working
towards the collective good (Verwimp, 2000, p. 345). If people were living in relative
isolation, then mandatory labor would provide an opportunity for community and the
promotion of Rwandan identity.
Finally, umuganda became a way to efficiently mobilize the peasantry. A call to
work was ingrained in the habitual actions of each Rwandan citizen. This became
exceptionally important during the genocide as the peasants were called to kill their
neighbors, to contribute to umuganda, and work towards the collective good of ridding
Rwanda of the Tutsi and any Hutu dissidents.
The main focus of the economy under the Habyarimana regime was coffee
production, although umuganda was also utilized to build infrastructure, including roads,
schools, and hospitals. Coffee, its high international demand combined with the fertility
of Rwandan soil, became the focus of agricultural production across the country.
Rwanda gained the ability to compete fairly with large coffee-producing nations in the
worldwide market as a formal member of the International Coffee Organization (ICO)
established in 1962. However, the production quotas established by the ICO resulted in a
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growing environmental crisis for the country. Kamola (2007) notes, "quotas locked
many African countries into small, inflexible market shares during a period of increased
international demand" (p. 581). The ability of Rwandans to produce coffee under the
auspices of umuganda, in addition to high international demand, resulted in an increased
GDP under the Habyarimana regime. 13
However, while the majority of land was being designated for coffee production,
less was being used to produce food; the stress on the land was severe considering the
Rwandan population was growing at an exponential rate. When the coffee economy
collapsed in the 1980s, Rwandans were left in an acute and life-threatening situation; this
economic vulnerability of the Rwandan peasantry allowed the Habyarimana regime to
tighten its control and set the stage for genocide.

Collapse of the Economy

The collapse of global coffee prices, famine (resulting from years of
environmental degradation), and the required implementation of a Structural Adjustment
Program (SAP) by international aid organizations further enforced anti-Tutsi rhetoric
stemming from the Habyarimana administration. Initially, Habyarimana' s forced
implementation of umuganda made important achievements, such as "the development of
infrastructure (roads in particular), in the expansion of schools and health centers, in
reforestation programs, and in attempts to promote increased agricultural production"

13

See Table 3

on

p. 44
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(Newbury, 2005, p. 14).

However, this initial success would soon become the by

product of a global economic crisis due to a number of factors:
...First, Rwanda was heavily dependent on export revenue from the sale of
coffee and tea and the prices for both commodities fell sharply during this
period. [In addition,] 'coffee export receipts fell from $144 mio (sec) in
1985 (an exceptionally good year) to $30 mio (sec) in 1993.' Second, after
1990, the government diverted its limited resources to the war effort,
fighting the invading Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) .. .Habyarimana
diverted upwards of 40 percent of the national budget to military purposes
between 1990 and 1994. And third, in 1990 the government agreed to a
structural adjustment program that led to 40 percent currency devaluation,
higher prices, higher taxes, and increased fees for a variety of services
(education, health, etc.). (Uvin, 1997, p. 106; Cannon, 2005, p. 6, as quoted
in Boudreaux, 2009, p. 4)
The history of the peasantry and the use of umuganda are directly related to the (over)use
of land and environmental degradation that occurred during the 1970s and 1980s, as
forced labor coincides with environmental practices (Newbury & Newbury, 2000, p.
870). The colonial polices of treating the land as small, separate spaces rather than in one
large ecological context were transferred into post-colonial human-environment
interactions. For example, "burning the fields was outlawed, complicating the
maintenance of pasturage. Reforestation entailed planting eucalyptus trees...[which]
were deleterious to the productive system .. . the toxicity of their roots makes them
unsuitable for intercropping" (Newbury & Newbury, 2000, p. 871). Since decades of soil
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degradation made much of the Rwandan countryside unsuitable for sustaining a variety of
agriculture, people turned to the steep slopes to plant their crops, cattle were scarce, and
"mobility was reduced so that people no longer had access to valley or forest resources"
(Newbury & Newbury, 2000, p. 871).
To further compound the agricultural situation, Habyarimana's resistance to any
implementation of family planning resulted in a surge in the Rwandan population. Under
the auspices of his pro-peasant ideology, deregulating birth control meant that there
would be more workers for, and therefore more production of, collective works projects.
In retrospect, "these policies were in fact virulently anti-peasant. .. Rwandan women had
the highest birthrate in the world. .. [and] from the perspective of the dictator, people are
production forces, which are used to produce coffee and to supply labor to 'collective
works' (um uganda)" (Verwimp, 2000, pp. 341-343).

Verwimp (2000) notes that

Habyarimana publicly recognized the population issue facing Rwanda, though he had a
tendency to blame over-population and the ensuing famine in the late 1980s on the Tutsi,
all which reinforced "the message [that] Rwanda had space for only one ethnic group" (p.
344).

Umuganda allowed the leaders to profit while the peasantry became paupers

(Bezy, 1990 as quoted in Smith, 1998, p. 746).

In fact, many scholars consider

ecological resource scarcity coupled with one of the highest population growth rates a
root cause of the genocide; "Rwanda is often considered a perfect example of this hard
Malthusian argument" (Uvin, 2001, p. 82).
The global economic crisis of the late 1970s hit the developing world especially
hard. International aid organizations, such as the World Bank, created an "array of small
farmer and community-level projects" that proved to be unsuccessful (Bates, 2008, p.
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113). In examining the failure, the World Bank laid the foundation for future Structural
Adjustment Programs (SAP) that would be implemented throughout much of the
developing world. Bates (2008) notes:
In its famed "Berg Report," the Bank documented the tendency of Africa's
governments to adopt policies that distorted market prices and undermined
economic incentives and so crippled growth and development. In addition
to being a financer of projects, the World Bank then became an advisor to
governments ...Sectoral programs soon gave way to country programs and
to conditionality, as the Bank sought to strengthen further its leverage over
policymakers in debtor nations and to sharpen the incentives for policy
reform. (p. 114-115)
As a way to hold government officials accountable for instituting these policy reforms, an
addendum to financial aid would require African leaders to take steps towards multi
partyism, usually in the form of open elections.
The plummet of global coffee prices in the late 1980s (dropping by roughly 50%),
forced income to fall from "$144 million in 1985 to $30 million in 1993;" not only was
the average coffee farmer negatively affected by the decrease in exports but also by the
"sharp devaluation of Rwandan currency" following the implementation of the SAP in
1990 (Mamdani, 2001, pp. 147-8). The World Bank regarded the failures to eliminate
coffee subsidies and reduce the budget deficit as breaking the contractual agreement so
they "refused to provide the second tranche of structural adjustment credit" (Mamdani,
2001, p. 148).

Economically, the Rwandan government was already in dire straits;
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however, the political situation would further erode any development efforts over the
course of the next four years.
The SAP design for Rwanda included a number of stipulations that would
theoretically decrease the influence of the MRND and encourage the development of a
multi-party system.
This programme entailed the removal of MRND one-party state control over
the economy (abolition of taxation, tariffs, and quantitative restrictions on
international commerce, reduction of state spending and privatization of
state enterprises) coupled with devaluation of the national currency. It was
to be combined with a marked contraction of both personnel employed by
the state and ofrevenues available to the state. (Langford, 2005, p. 24)
However, the invasion of the Rwandan Patriotic Front in October of 1990 "enabled the
MRND one-party state to discard its previous discourse of development and to present
the reassertion of its authority in an overtly racial discourse in which the state was
represented as a Hutu state threatened by internal and external enemies" (Langford, 2005,
p. 11).
The RPF were heavily outnumbered within the first week of invasion after the
sudden death of their leader, Fred Rwigema. They retreated back across the border into
Uganda to regroup. For Rwandans, the invasion resulted in heavy, long-term increases in
military spending as the MRND and government forces prepared for any future onslaught
(Marysse, et al. , 1994, p. 36). Shortly thereafter, in yet another violation of the SAP
agreement, the Habyarimana regime began to accept aid directly from Belgium and
France. The MRND would forgo any move towards multi-partyism by further
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consolidating its control and this unintended consequence meant the end of any hope for
international diplomatic aid.
Contrary to the assumption that all the Rwandan peasantry unquestionably obeyed
government elites, there were a number of resistance movements, both organized and
unorganized, that developed in the early 1990s across the countryside. Smith (1998)
comments, "in the period from 1989 to 1993, the state had much to fear" (p. 746). One
calculated act of resistance towards the current economic and political climate came in
the form of 300,000 burned coffee trees (Pottier & Nkundabashaka, 1991, p. 151), of
which many were planted by umuganda (Longman, 1995, p. 19). In fact, the resistance
movements had become so widespread that even "umuganda and political animations
became passe, simply because people refused to participate any longer" (Smith, 1998, p.
746). The refusal to participate in umuganda is significant, primarily because first, it is
the ultimate rejection of the economic and government system under Habyarimana and
second, an exercise in the only effective threat that the Rwandan peasantry could harbor
against the administration.
The consequences of prolonged social and economic tensions were also impacted
by the waves of refugees that crossed over Rwandan borders, both coming and going,
from the late 1950s through the early 1990s. There were three major periods of exodus
for Rwandan Tutsis: 1959-1961, 1963-1964, and 1973; the first came after the revolution,
the second was "triggered by the repression that followed each major inyenzi attempts to
restore Tutsi power through armed attacks," and the third as a result of the internal
political crisis and the transition from the First to Second Republic (Mamdani, 2001, p.
160).

General estimations place between 400,000 and 600,000 Tutsi refugees in

FROM THE GROUND UP

33

neighboring countries during this period of time (Human Rights Watch, 1994, p. 8).
Refugee status remained in flux in most neighboring countries; changing laws and
legislation regarding who was considered to be an official refugee forced many into
vulnerable situations, including displacement, deportation, and the onslaught of
xenophobic attacks from local civilians.
The planning of genocide occurred before April of 1994; organized, state
sponsored massacres of Tutsi in 1990 and 1991 were the answer to Habyarimana's
problem of civil unrest. The invasion of the RPF caused much disorder and rebellion the MRND needed to restore its authority:
In the northern communes ... [there were] localized massacres of the Tutsi
population (October 1990, Kibilira and Mutara; January 1991, Bagogwe
region). The importance of these massacres rests upon the manner in which
they were organized and directed by local officials of the
MRND ...Although these massacres were carried out in the context of
continuing conflict with the RPF in the northern prefectures, they
demonstrated the capacity of the MRND to direct, and for its local officials
to implement, a programme of killings. (Langford, 2005, p. 12)
The ability to efficiently practice the mobilization of citizens is the rationale for these
massacres prior to the genocide. Mamdani (2001) notes "the civilian Hutu population
was urged and organized to defend itself against an expected massacre by the RPF and its
civilian collaborators" (p. 192). In fact, many scholars suggest that the structural
organization for the genocide was well in place as early as 1992:
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It involved four distinctive levels of activity or sets of actors: (a) the akazu
("little house" in Kinyarwanda), that is the core group, consisting of
Habyarimana' s immediate entourage, i.e. his wife (Agathe), his three
brothers-in-law (Protee Zigiranyirazo, Seraphin Rwabukumba and Elie
Sagatwa), and a sprinkling of trusted advisors (most notably Joseph
Nzirorera, Laurent Serubuga and Ildephonse Gashumba); (b) the rural
organizers, numbering anywhere from two to three hundred, drawn from the
communal and prefectoral cadres; (c) the militas (interahamwe), estimated
at 30,000, forming the ground-level operatives in charge of doing the actual
killing; (d) the presidential guard, recruited exclusively among northerners,
and trained with a view to providing auxiliary slaughterhouse support to
civilian death squads. (Lemarchand, 1995, 10)

The Use of Umuganda in the Genocide

The genocide began on April 7, 1994, the day after President Habyarimana's
plane was shot down while returning from peace talks with the RPF in neighboring
Arusha, Tanzania. The Arusha Accords were an attempt to develop a system of power
sharing within the Rwandan government between the MRND and the RPF, or
symbolically, between the Hutu and the Tutsi. Lemarchand (1995) remarks:
. . . .the RPF would have a total of five cabinet seats out of a total of 21, and
eleven seats in the transitional national assembly out of a total of 70,
putting it on par with the ruling MRND. Compromise, likewise, was the
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name of the game in the restructuring of the armed forces: 40 per cent of
the troops and 50 per cent of the officer corps would consist of RPF
elements. (p. 9)
Following the aforementioned localized massacres, the genocide was to ensure that there
would be no compromise or power sharing with the RPF, or the Tutsi in general.
Amid chaos and confusion, the plane crash was blamed on the RPF and Tutsi
forces both within and outside of Rwanda. While current scholarship reports that Hutu
extremists are most likely responsible for the assassination of the President, Radio
Rwanda and the independently owned Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines
(RTLM) implicated the Tutsi inyenzi as the culprits. Radio was an extremely effective
communication medium for the rapid implementation of genocide; "hate media" and the
publication of the Ten Hutu Commandments after the first RPF invasion solidified and
reinforced Hutu extremism.
Invoking a sense of biblical duty, the Ten Hutu Commandments were repeatedly
broadcast across the nationally-sponsored Radio Rwanda and extremist RTLM:
Every Muhutu should know that a Mututsi woman, wherever she is,
works for the interest of her Tutsi ethnic group. As a result, we shall
consider a traitor any Muhutu who:
marries a Tutsi woman,
befriends a Tutsi woman,
employs a Tutsi woman as a secretary or a concubine.
2. Every Muhutu should know that our Hutu daughters are more suitable
and conscientious in their role as woman, wife and mother of the family.
Are they not beautiful, good secretaries and more honest?
3.
Bahutu women, be vigilant and try to bring your husbands, brothers
and sons back to reason.
4.
Every Muhutu should know that every Mututsi is dishonest in
business. His only aim is the supremacy of his ethnic group. As a result,
any Muhutu who does the following is a traitor:
makes a partnership with Batutsi in business,
1.
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invests his money or the government's money in a Tutsi
enterprise,
lends or borrows money for a Mututsi, gives favours to Batutsi in
business (obtaining import licences, bank loans, construction
sites, public markets...).
5. All strategic positions, political, administrative, economic, and
military and security should be entrusted to Bahutu.
6.
The education sector (school pupils, students, teachers) must be
majority Bahutu.
7.
The Rwandese Armed Forces should be exclusively Hutu. The
experience of the October [1990] war has taught us a lesson. No member
of the military shall marry a Tutsi.
The Bahutu should stop having mercy on the Batutsi.
8.
9.
The Bahutu, wherever they are, must have unity and solidarity, and
be concerned with the fate of their Hutu brothers.
The Bahutu inside and outside Rwanda must constantly look for
friends and allies for the Hutu cause, starting with their Bantu
brothers;
They must constantly counteract the Tutsi propaganda;
The Bahutu must be firm and vigilant against their common
Tutsi enemy.
The Social Revolution of 1959, the Referendum of 1961, and the
Hutu Ideology, must be taught to every Muhutu at every level. Every Hutu
must spread this ideology widely. Any Muhutu who persecutes his brother
Muhutu for having read, spread and taught this ideology, is a traitor.
(Munyaneza, 1999, 37)

10.

Through the use of radio, the invocation of umuganda, and the euphemism of "work"
incited killings: family members, neighbors, average, non-militant people committed
murder. Li (2007) states, " RTLM's notorious use of 'work' as a euphemism (with
machetes as 'tools') needs to be understood in the context of development, with
participation (manning roadblocks, taking part in night patrols, conducting house
searches, clearing fields) being likened to umuganda on a number of occasions" (p. 96).
This overt use of "existing discourses of development" played into the collective
conscious of national survival - the Tutsis must be eradicated in order to further
progress Rwanda economically, politically, and socially (Li, 2007, in Thompson, 2007, p.
96). The mass exile of Tutsis since independence allowed for prejudice to increase
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developmentally. Radio often manipulated already engrained fears regarding the return
of these refugees: one broadcast stated, "When you kill the rat do not let the pregnant one
escape . . . We made the mistake thirty years ago of letting them flee into exile, this time
none will escape" (Isbister, 1998, p. 133).
As discussed, it is problematic to assume that all Rwandan citizens are open to
manipulation; yet, one must not underestimate the influence of radio as the primary
source of communication to citizens nor how it impacted a strictly programmed and
scheduled population:
In contemplating the question of obedience in the genocide, it is important
to note that the capture and mobilization of state resources by its
orchestrators mirrored a gradual appropriation of the cornerstones of
collective life for the purposes of the killing. The genocide extended beyond
bureaucracies to other everyday routines and contexts ... Radio, which
bookends and punctuates the daily routine of many ordinary Rwandans,
continued to do so during the genocide. RTLM did not simply whip Hutu
into a frenzy to channel fear and anger into sudden attacks. Rather, through
the daily diet of informational updates, operational details (not to leave
bodies on the road in view of Western journalists, for example), and
encouraging monologues, it contributed to the framing of schedules and the
routinization of "work." (Li, 2004, p. 20)
The discourse of Rwandan history and development, steeped in collective action, was
exploited. As Li (2004) comments, "active participation in the genocide [was] broader
than simple hatred or fear [because of] the context in which euphemisms such as 'work'
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and 'cockroaches' could be easily understood" (p. 13).

Young people, the target

audience for the independent RTLM, believed that in killing Tutsis and Hutu dissidents,
they were working for the development of the country. The glorification of the peasantry
created the foundations of a killing force, generated and enforced by young Hutu
militants (Jnterahamwe) eager to contribute. "Chilling broadcasts invited listeners to join
in the killing, as if this were an appeal to patriotism: 'The grave is only half-full. Who
will help us fill it?' (Mamdani, 2001, p. 212). The use of radio to incite genocide as an
act of umuganda reinforced an already established organizational structure for mass
murder; during the 1980s, the MRND made a number of decisions regarding umuganda
that directly relates to the organization of the genocide, in which Verwimp (2000) has
chronicled in Table 2.
Table 2
Comparison ofdecisions regarding Umuganda
A) Decisions of November 12,
1.

Members

of the

Organization of the genocide

1982

National

Umuganda

Commission:
-

1 . The highest authorities of the country
including:

The secretary-general of the MRND

-

The President

-

President and secretary-general of the

(President)

:MRND

-

Ministry of Planning

-

Ministry of Public Works

-

Ministry of Agriculture

-

Ministry of the Interior

-

Vice President of the CND

-

Secretary-general of the Chamber of

-

All MRND ministers and important
army

o fficers

together

with

the

brothers of Habyarimana organize
genocide in Rwanda from 1 990 to

1 994

Commerce

2. At the level of the prefecture, a Commission

2.

in charge of Umuganda composed of MRND

massacres in the 1 990- 1 994 period. They lead

officials is installed

the population in the execution of the genocide

3.

Rehabilitation

of

manual

l abor

and

3.

MRND officials given orders to execute

National and local officials use the word
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Umuganda to describe the killing

obligatory nature of Umuganda

4. Local officials have to feel concerned about

4. The population should act like one person to

the

destroy the forces of evil

political

weight

of

the

Umuganda

institution, serve as an example and manage the
population

5.

a

5. Individuals are forced to kill, implicate most

proportional way in order to appreciate the

Hutu in the killing. Refusal to kill is a death

work of each group objectively

warrant

One

should

allocate

the

task

in

6. For the Communal Works of Development,

6.

each participant must bring his own equipment.

Rwandans own, is the main instrument used in

Only heavy or collective material will be given

the killing. F irearms are used by officials in

by the Cell

case of resistance

Machetes,

an

agricultural

tool

most

7. Accumulation of unfinished projects or not

7. Propaganda calls upon peasants to finish the

useful projects must be avoided

project, meaning that nobody should escape

Umuganda projects have to be harmonized
with national programs

8.

The militants must b e informed o n the

results

of

the

C ommunal

Works

for

Development, the destination of the products of

8 . Members of the genocidal government tell
peasants not to hesitate to kill because killing is
already going on in the rest of the country

the harvest and on the evolution of Umuganda
in other parts of the country

B) Decisions of June 27,

Or2anization of the 2enocide

1984

1 . Decision the hours of work for Umuganda

1.

and on the radio broadcasting for Umuganda

government officials incite the Hutu population

At public meetings and on the radio,

to do a special Umuganda

2.

Umuganda will take seven hours starting

from the place of work

3.
the

The official responsible fo r Umuganda at
level

o f the

2. Genocidal government decides who shall be
killed first and who next

Cell will

decide when

Umuganda finishes, but one should not leave

3.

Local offici�ls determine the start and the

end of the killing. lnterahamwe ("those who
work together") kill day and night

the place before 1 0 o'clock

4.

In order to strengthen the sensitization for

Mille Umuganda, the Central Committee has

4. Radio Rwanda and Radio Collines provide
false information on the RPF and incite killing

decided that Radio Rwanda will provide
broadcasting on Umuganda and animation

C) Decisions of April

10, 1986

Or2anization of the 2enocide

1 . A price of 1 ,000,000 FRW will be given to

1 . Various incentives used to implicate people

the Commune ranked first in the Umuganda

in the killing, from giving free beer, the chance

activities. This price will be inscribed on the

to loot the house of the killed person, to extract
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budget of the MRND presidency
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cash from victims and grab a plot of land

Source: Verwitnp, 2000, pp. 352-353
With its roots in the creation of a stable social order in order to enforce the
importance of the Rwandan peasantry, umuganda was utilized and exploited in the
efficient mobilization of these very same peasants to commit acts of genocide. The
structural development of the MRND's genocide machine helps to dismantle one
prominent ideology of the Rwandan peasantry - they are psychologically pre
dispositioned to obedience, so if they are ordered to kill, they kill. "The obedience
explanation is very popular because it nicely complements the popular elite manipulation
model," Uvin (2001, p. 84) notes. Ultimately, this dynamic demonstrates that the leaders,
rather than the followers, are guilty.
Placing the ultimate blame on those in charge also helps to explain the role of
reluctant Hutus, of which there were many. Punishments, "ranging in severity from the
destruction of personal property to incarceration and death" were broadcast over RTLM
and "communicated repeatedly in consciousness-raising meetings, speeches, songs, and
slogans, all couched in terms of a communal or national duty" (Bhavnani, 2006, p. 666).
It is this national duty, coupled with the threats of punishment that drive mass
participation. The blanket assumption that all Rwandans are merely obedient ignores the
methodical organization and influence of the elite and dilutes the blame onto each
individual citizen. However, incorporating the institutionalization of umuganda supports
the theory of elite manipulation, while dismissing the assumption that every Rwandan is
merely subservient.

41

FROM THE GROUND UP

The Role of Umuganda in Post-Genocide Development

Following the genocide that left close to 800,000 people dead, Rwanda was
destroyed; infrastructure was burned to the ground amongst piles of corpses that clogged
waterways and were haphazardly thrown into mass burials. The RPF defeated the
MRND in July, just three months after Habyarimana' s plane was shot down. General
Paul Kagame, complete with a British education and U.S. military training, understood
that

"given

the

state

of the

nation' s

distribution

and

transportation

networks ... infrastructural development" was one of the first points of rebuilding (Ryan,
2010, p. 14). Once again, umuganda would become the center of state development
planning.
It was important for Rwanda to move towards building a sustainable future after
the initial reliance on humanitarian aid in the years following the genocide. Vision 2020
became the government's first major development planning document and continually
emphasized the role of the peasants and umuganda. The main goals included:
1. Reconstruction of the nation and its social capital anchored on good
governance, underpinned by a capable state;
2. Transformation of agriculture into a productive, high value, market
oriented sector, with forward linkages to other sectors;
3. Development of an efficient private sector spearheaded by
competitiveness and entrepreneurship;
4. Comprehensive human resources development, encompassing
education, health, and ICT skills aimed at public sector, private sector
and civil society. To be integrated with demographic, health and
gender issues;
5. Infrastructural development, entailing improved transport links, energy
and water supplies and ICT networks;
6. Promotion of regional economic integration and cooperation.
(MINECOFIN, 2000, pp. 4-5)
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Referred to as the Six Pillars, the goals of Vision 2020 placed much importance on the
cooperation of all Rwandan citizens in post-genocide development. Collaborative work
environments could help to ease collective memory and promote social and political
inclusion while also generating economic prosperity. In the promotion of a knowledgebased economy, heralded as "the most important engine" of Rwanda's economic
machine, Vision 2020 points to the use of umuganda and the "plentiful supply of cheap
labour. .. making it easy to build infrastructure" (MINECOFIN, 2000, p. 9). The
orchestration of umuganda would be initiated by government elites in the early stages of
development, though the IMF (2000) notes in their Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper,
I

"the tradition of umuganda, community labour, needs to evolve from a top-down to a
participatory mode in which communities take responsibility for the provision and
maintenance of those local public goods which the state cannot finance" (p. 9). For
example, Rwanda faced major environmental challenges in the late 1990's; deforestation
and soil erosion left the countryside and agricultural cultivation at serious risk. In 2000,
the Rwandan government "launched a program of afforestation under which 65,000
hectares of forest [were] to be planted. About 80% of the costs are to be covered by
umuganda" (IMF, 2000, pp. 27-28). Umuganda would not just rebuild the infrastructure

and economy, but it would continually provide opportunities for interaction with both the
state and fellow citizens:
At the local government level, the key issue is of building trust and
tolerance among and between individual citizens, ensuring greater
empowerment and participation of citizens who are recovering from a
legacy of no or partial participation in decision making and constrained
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access to services. Activities suggested include sensitising and training all
district, sector, cell & umudugudu leaders about unity and reconciliation,
empowering districts to set up clear guidelines and principles for
employment, recruitment and access to services; setting up unity clubs in all
districts; facilitating the use of um uganda to discuss progress and
constraints to achieving unity and reconciliation. (MINECOFIN, 2000, p.
87)

According to government and international organization documents, the purpose of
(re)implementing um uganda can be deconstructed to exemplify the significance of
promoting inclusion through the rebuilding of infrastructure. The citizenry will reconnect
to the state and one another by being a part of the development process; however, there
are a number of questions that this policy strategy poses: can it be demonstrated that
umuganda promotes social, political, and economic inclusion and development? Are

these three areas of rebuilding independent or interdependent on one another? According
to the World Bank Development Indicators (2011), Rwanda has made improvements in
several areas since 2000: Gross Domestic Product has quadrupled ($1 74 billion in 2000
.

to $5.63 billion in 2010), infant mortality rate has nearly been cut in half (105 7 deaths
.

per 1,000 live births in 2000 to 59.1 in 2010), and the percentage of children who
complete primary school has doubled (22% completion rate in 2000 to 54% completion
rate in 2010).
It is evident that by building a sustainable economic system immersed in the
world market, Rwanda is getting closer to one of the government's primary goals -
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freedom from foreign aid. If looking at the growth of GDP alone, the implementation of
umuganda has a direct impact, as demonstrated in Table 3.

Table 3
Gross Domestic Product, Rwanda, 1960-2010
$6B

$5 B

$4 B

$3 B

$2 B

$1 B

1 965

1970

1 975

1 980

1985

1 990

1995

2000

2005

2010

Source: World Bank Development Indicators, 2011, http://data.worldbank.org/data
catalog/world-development-indicators

When Habyarimana touted umuganda as central to the development plans
instituted in 1974, the national GDP rose steadily from $309 million to $2.6 billion in
1990, before the implementation of SAPs and internal political conflicts adversely
affected the whole of the Rwandan economy. Similarly, using umuganda as the primary
source of labor for the rebuilding of infrastructure in post-genocide Rwanda, the growth
rate has been impressive.
However, hindsight demonstrates that GDP cannot be the sole indication of
sustainability. There are (at least) three different measures of "development:" economic
growth, political development, and human development; GDP speaks solely to economic
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growth but fails to measure other important activities, such as "the construction of
democratic institutions, the establishment of a performing banking system, the rule of law
and an independent judicial system, a free press, and access to health care and education"
(Verwimp, 2000, p. 329).
If we can assume, based on GDP alone, umuganda is encouraging economic growth,
how does it fare in other areas of development, namely human and political? There is an
obvious poetic notion in the concept of Rwandans, of all ages, socioeconomic, and
political status, working collectively one Saturday a month to rebuild the nation's
infrastructure; side-by-side constructing roads, schools, and hospitals while leaving the
ethnic distinctions of Hutu and Tutsi presumably in the past (enforced through the
illegality of these terms). 14

However, scholarship is divided as to the level of direct

impact that umuganda has on social and political progress. Verwimp (2000) suggests
that dictators like economic growth as it "gives them more resources to satisfy the elite's
desire for consumption. . . thereby increasing the dictator's power" (p. 333). Based on this,
current use of umuganda can be viewed a political maneuver to solidify the elite's control
of the peasants, much in the same way it was utilized under the Habyarimana
administration.
Umuganda can serve as ideal venue for the state to communicate with its citizens and

implement other development goals. One such example is family planning. As Africa's
most densely populated country, Rwanda is considered to be a quintessential Malthusian
dilemma. An unregulated population will negatively result in environmental degradation,
and therefore, famine, disease, and war. Legitimately, the Rwandan government is wary
14

There are controversies surrounding the ability to be exempt from umuganda, especially if you are a

member of the political elite.
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of an expanding youth bulge - in order to potentially avoid problems of the past, the
young men (and women) of the country need to be kept occupied and incorporated into
the economic system.
One key difference between the use of umuganda under the Habyarimana regime and
that of the Kagame administration is the regulation and institution of family planning
practices. As noted earlier, in his glorification of the peasantry, Habyarimana ignored the
implementation of any forms of population control. More people meant more labor,
which in tum, meant more production and wealth. Yet, uncontrolled population growth
has had devastating consequences that Rwandans are currently confronting.
In comparison, the contemporary implementation of umuganda may be no different
than how citizens, women specifically, were exploited as the main contributors to the
Rwandan labor force for many decades. According to Baines (2003), "the state,
community, and family were highly dependent upon women to carry out free labour, and
to reproduce the population. Social control was maintained by regulating sexuality, in
addition to denial of basic citizenship rights - such as land ownership" (483). Though
"regulating sexuality" is one aspect of the government control, it serves as an interesting
vignette to the family planning conversation. Rwanda's population has doubled since the
genocide, 5.8 million people in 1995 and 10.6 million in 2010 (World Bank, 2011).
Family planning initiatives are an integral part of development, however, not an easy
task. Anicet Nzabonimpa, Family Planning and HIV Integration Coordinator for
Rwanda's Ministry of Health, stated, "It was very difficult to talk about family planning
after the genocide. . . people wanted to replace those who died" (Rosen, 2010).
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There are multiple efforts to keep Rwandans from perpetually reproducing, including
condom distribution and education and the implementation of the Standard Days Method,
a system in which Rwanda women and their partner are able to keep track of her fertile
window using CycleBeads, a hand-held system of beads and rings. According to Blair,
Sinai, Mukabatsinda & Muramutsa (2007):
The woman or her partner move a black ring along their CycleBeads daily,
one bead each day. The position of the ring. . . conveys whether the woman
is in her fertile window (days 8-19 of the cycle). When the band is on a
white bead (representing a fertile day) the couple avoids unprotected
intercourse to prevent pregnancy. They can use a barrier method or abstain
from intercourse on these days . . . the majority of respondents, male and
female, found that CycleBeads were easy to use and interpret. (64)
The instruction and discussion regarding family planning education initiatives takes
place in the communal meetings following umuganda, since it is regarded as the primary
time in which to speak to the whole community (national and local) regarding additional
projects of development. Other methods of communication, namely the media, are
intensely regulated by the current Rwandan administration given the role of independent
radio and newspapers in inciting the genocide. In essence, umuganda serves multiple
ends; there are the tangible products that result from physical labor (infrastructure) and
there are the intangible products that are the result of using umuganda as a means for the
government to share information with all of the public. It can be determined that the state
is benefiting from umuganda, though scholarship is divided on the positive impact for the
citizenry.
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According the Rwandan government, umuganda has been successfully incorporated
into the Rwandan development scheme; in order to stimulate the economy and create
sustainable (in)tangible infrastructure, umuganda is considered essential. President
Kagame (2011) commented:
The way to avoid dependency and indignity is for Rwandans to value
work, to work together, as is the practice with umuganda, and to do the
right thing, including planting trees, productive agriculture, building
schools for Rwandan children, subscribing to community health
insurance. . . and to promote commerce and business in order to generate
wealth. (The New Times)
The direct impact of umuganda's role in Rwandan political development remains to be
clear. Fisley (1998) states, "the idea that social hatreds and inclusions arise and fall
historically in conditions where political power is consolidated and deployed," therefore
inclusion in "Rwanda civil society rests ... on political will" (p. 17). The "political will"
can come in the form of public participation in the democratic system or it could be the
implementation of a development dictatorship.
There is an increase in research suggesting "semi-democracies are most likely to
erupt into violence - certainly more likely than both authoritarian regimes and
established democracies"15 (Uvin, 2001, 93). The current state of Rwanda's political
climate is seemingly stable, though poverty, unemployment, and its sizable population
make Rwanda susceptible to these possible "eruptions" that Uvin speaks of. It can be

15

Uvin (200 1 ) also suggests that the Rwandan genocide was a product of international pressure to

democratize under the auspices of SAPs in the late 1 980s and early 1 990s.
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argued that, in theory, umuganda plays an integral role in creating participation and
inclusion in a democratic state. Ideally, umuganda would provide an avenue in which
members of the local community, under the guise of the national one, collectively discuss
the state of their union. This collaboration would serve as an integral foundation for the
democratic system at the grassroots level; citizens would be involved in the decision
making progress choosing umuganda projects that are specific to their community needs.
Research into the impact of umuganda in the democratic process is minimal, though one
field study regarding the Rwandan inter-organizational development network suggests
that umuganda is not serving the needs of the peasants, and in fact, structurally resembles
the umuganda of previous administrations. Although, "umuganda projects are often
generated by residents' demands/feedback," typically "project-related umuganda
activities seemingly flow from the top-down, as national leaders set development targets
that trickle down to umudugudu [community]" (Ryan, 2010, pp. 21-22). Projects are
chosen by bureaucratic officials who attempt to balance the available resources and goals
of President Kagame's development plans with local demand. Ryan (2010) suggests
"that peasants have limited input into the selection of umuganda projects" yet it serves as
"a source of inspiration for young leaders, including many college students" (pp. 23-24).
The extent to which um uganda is truly serving the needs of the peasants while also
providing democratic inclusion in increasing economic development requires further
research.
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Concluding Remarks

On one hand, umuganda is no more than a system in which to exploit peasant labor
and highlight the frustrations of the young men who were the "most vulnerable to the
kind of ethnic appeals that led to genocide" in the first place (Uvin, 1998, p. 137). Yet, in
comparison, it is a "tradition that served as a driving force for positive change . . . based on
the idea that every individual must contribute to and feel responsible for the community's
well being" (Agbor, 2011). President Kagame recognizes how some Rwandans do not
feel that umuganda is serving their direct interests noting:
I have yet to understand this - all our children are in school, we care for
the health of all Rwandans and are working for their welfare, for food
security, good nutrition; providing access to new technology, including
computers for our school children so they can communicate with
whomever they want and Rwandans can access all the information they
want; Rwandans choose the leaders they want to work with; we do
everything to promote citizens' development. But after listing all this, the
conclusion of some is that Rwandans don't have space to express
themselves. (The New Times, 2011)
Regardless, the role umuganda plays in Rwandan economic and political development is
deliberate and indicative of how integral the peasantry is to rebuilding efforts. Rwandans
are collectively cooperating in the physical labor of constructing their nation by utilizing
the same ritual that laid the foundation for mass participation in the genocide.
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Appendix
Glossary of Kinyarwanda Terms
akazu - small
ganwa

house, hut

- royal , elite social class

Imana - God
interahamwe -

those who attack together

Interahamwe

Hutu youth militia that was perpetrator in 1994 genocide

inyenzi

-

-

cockroach

kwihutura

to cease being a Hutu , by gaining wealth in pre-colonial Rwanda

-

mwami - king
rutsindamapfa
ubuhake

royal granary

- traditional contract of cattle loaning

ubureetwa umuheto

-

-

traditional feudal land distribution system based on labor

bow; military service

umudugudu

-

collection of homes , the smallest administrative grouping

umuganda - communal

work, national service

